This paper shows that a competitive equilibrium model, where a representative agent maximizes welfare, expectations are rational and markets are in equilibrium can account for several hyperinflation stylized facts. The theory is built by combining two hypotheses, namely, a fiscal crisis that requires printing money to finance an increasing public deficit and a predicted change in an unsustainable fiscal regime.
INTRODUCTION
seminal work provided the first attempt to explain the hyperinflation phenomenom. That essay was so influential that small variations of Cagan's model can be found in several textbooks such as Blanchard and Fischer (1989) , Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) , Romer (2001) and Sargent (1987 We summarize the current knowledge on hyperinflaton in the following way. In standard macro models, it is necessary to impose a deviation from rational expectations and/or to violate the government budget constraint for the model to generate hyperinflation. In other types of models, the hyperinflation may arise as a consequence of agents not being fully informed.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that a standard macroeconomic model with rational expectations is capable of displaying a hyperinflation as a competitive equilibrium outcome. To achieve that result, we introduced two major features in our model: a fiscal crisis that requires printing money to finance an increasing public deficit and a predicted change in an unsustainable fiscal regime.
One of the features of Cagan's model that, under our point of view, contributed to its long lasting influence is the fact that its solution provides an unbounded path for the inflation rate. Clearly, an inflation path that diverges to infinite will qualify as a hyperinflation process under any sounding definition of hyperinflation.
Neither Marcet and Nicolini (2003) nor Zarazaga (1993) models display an explosive inflation trajectory as an equilibrium outcome. This is not necessarily the case in our model. If the demand for money is inelastic with respect to the nominal interest rate, then the competitive equilibrium of our model may display an explosive inflation path.
We want to emphasize that our model is consistent with several hyperinflation stylized facts. Namely, the model is able to match the following features:
1. the real stock of money approaches zero; 2. the rate of inflation grows unboundedly; 3. the public deficit is financed by issuing money; 4. hyperinflation duration is variable and depends on the fiscal conditions of each experience; 5. hyperinflation stops overnight through a change in the monetary policy regime.
1
The fiscal crisis is the source of hyperinflation and we may paraphrase Friedman [(1970) , p.25] and state that hyperinflation is always and everywhere a fiscal phenomenon, in the sense that a hyperinflation caused by a bubble has not been observed. The fiscal crisis is taken as given and there will be no attempt in this paper to explain the reasons that led a society to choose such a course of action. There is no doubt that institutions as well as economic policies should be explained by economic theory, since they are the outcome of choices and interaction among different groups of the society. This topic, however, is in the realm of political economy and will not be addressed here. The public knows that the intertemporal government budget constraint, under this fiscal crisis, is not sustainable in the long run and therefore expects a policy regime switch to occur in the near future.
Before turning to the theory, let us comment on three important points made by Cagan that has shaped both the empirical and theoretical studies on hyperinflation. First, Cagan's demand function for real cash balances yields a rate of inflation that maximizes inflation tax revenue. He observed that the average rate of rise in prices in the experiences he examined were well above the constant rates that would have maximized inflation tax revenue. This puzzle led several researchers (e.g. Bruno and Fischer (1990) ; Sargent and Wallace (1987) ) to suggest solutions that could help understand the reasons why the government was operating on the wrong side of the Laffer curve. This puzzle may indeed be a pure statistical artifact implied by his maintained hypothesis. In the model we work 1 See Bresciani-Turroni (1937), Cagan (1956) , and Sargent (1982) , for an account of stylized facts observed in several European hyperinflation experiences. out in this paper there is no such a puzzle because we are not convinced that Cagan's functional form is a stylized fact of hyperinflation experiences.
Secondly, Cagan (1956, pp. 77/78) remarked that "In the unsettled conditions following the two world wars, governments were too weak to enact adequate tax programs and to administer them effectively. Issuing money was a method of raising revenue... [that] does not require detailed legislation and can be administerd very simply". This statement is a good description of the fiscal crisis that underlies every hyperinflation, but previous works were not able to deal with it in a proper framework because they took this statement at face value. This paper interprets the fiscal crisis as the infeasibility of the intertemporal government budget constraint in the long run, under the economic policy regime in place and it shows that the inflation rates observed in hyperinflation experiences do not attain the maximum of inflation tax revenue that could be collected from society.
Thirdly, Cagan excluded some of the observations near the end of the hyperinflations because they could not be fitted by his model. He offered two hypotheses to explain these observations. The first assumes that individuals expect a currency reform, so prices would not go on rising for long, and they would hold more cash balances than the amount predicted by his demand for money equation. Flood and Garber (1980) pursued this hypothesis and they developed a theory of monetary reform. However, their model lacks microfoundations, e.g., the expected rate of inflation (the opportunity cost of holding money) is affected by the incoming monetary reform but this premium on the currency reform is not derived from first principles. The second hypothesis suggested by Cagan to explain the failure of his equation to account for the final months of some hyperinflations was that the data would not conform to his functional form. The model to be presented in this paper follows Cagan's second hypothesis, but also takes into consideration the fact that individuals in a hyperinflation environment knows that a currency reform will occur in the near future. The fact that the public expects a regime switch does not need to imply that the opportunity cost of holding money decreases as the time of the currency reform gets closer, since the interest rate does not necessarily have to include a premium on the currency reform. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of Cagan's model and some of its underlying hypotheses that have been overlooked in the literature. Section 3 presents a theoretical model that yields a competitive equilibrium hyperinflation path.
Section 4 presents the solution of that model. Section 5 concludes. Technical issues are discussed in Appendixes A, B and C. As shown in Figure 1 , inflation tax revenue increases and goes to a finite number when the real quantity of money approaches zero. Therefore, Cagan had implicitly assumed that real quantity of money was an inelastic function of the observed inflation rate. We show in Appendix C that the ability of the model to generate an unbounded path for the inflation depends on the hypothesis that the demand for real balances is inelastic with respect to the interest rate.
CAGAN'S MODEL OF HYPERINFLATION

HYPERINFLATION: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Hyperinflation is seen by the public to be unsustainable in the long run at least for two reasons. First, if the fiscal regime goes on forever it violates the intertemporal budget constraint of the government. Second, because money is essential to the functioning of the economy. Therefore, the public predicts that at some point in the near future a stabilization program will stop the hyperinflation process. However, the timing of the stabilization is unknown and to deal with this fact the model has to be stochastic. Thus, the probability mechanism of a regime change belongs to the information set of the representative agent. This uncertainty will be described by the distribution function F(t), which gives to each instant t the probability that a policy regime switch will occur before or at that moment t.
The public knows that the switch will occur at most at the instant h t . Thus, the distribution function F(t) is defined on the interval [0, h t ]. To make the exposition easier,
we assume that h t is exogenous. In Appendix C we extend the analysis to the case in which h t is endogenous.
The economic policy regime switch anticipated by the public will have the following characteristics: i) the central bank will stop issuing money to finance the public deficit; ii) the level of government expenditures will remain the same and will be financed by lump sum taxes; iii) the price level will be stabilized and the central bank will increase the stock of money once and for all at the moment of stabilization, and then iv) the central bank will hold the stock of money constant afterwards.
Thus, the nominal stock of money at the moment of stabilization T is given by,
where M(x) is the stock of money at the instant x, z(x) is the additional flow of money at period x, and ) (T M ∆ is the once and for all increase in the stock of money at the moment of stabilization. The representative agent maximizes the expected value of the discounted flow of utilities,
where ρ is the rate of time preference, the utility function depends on consumption (c) and the services provided by money (m=M/P , M is the nominal stock of money and P is the price index), and a subscript s on a function denotes its value after stabilization has taken place. We assume that the representative agent has constant levels of consumption and real stock of money from the point of stabilization onward. The functions u(c) and v(m) are concave and have the traditional properties. The agent maximizes (1) subject to the flow restriction,
and the stock restriction,
where
τ is a lump sum tax, c is consumption, y is real income and
is the transfer made by the government at stabilization time.
The solution to this problem (see Appendix A and Drazen and Helpman (1990), and the references cited there, for more details), show that at each moment before the policy regime switch takes place, the nominal rate of interest is equal to the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for money,
When there is uncertainty about the timing of a regime change the interest rate may include a risk premium. If at the time of stabilization the price level would be allowed to have a downward jump, for example, the agent would expect a capital gain and the risk premium would be negative. If at the time of stabilization government spending would be cut, consumption would increase, the marginal utility of consumption decreases, and the rate of interest would include a positive risk premium. 4 There is no interest rate risk premium in equation (4) because the stabilization program will allow neither a price jump nor a change in the flow of consumption.
The market for goods and services is in equilibrium when output is equal to the sum of consumption and government (g) expenditures:
The government finances its constant level of expenditures through a lump sum tax and issuing money:
The analysis of this case will not be pursued here, since the qualitative results would not change.
The public deficit, financed by isssuing money, increases through time according to:
We assume that the deficit to be financed by money can be at most equal to the level of government expenditures. The last inequality in the expression above characterizes the fiscal crisis. It says that as time goes by, the fiscal deficit to be financed by money becomes larger than the maximum amount of inflation tax ) ( s that can be collected from society.
MODEL SOLUTION
The economic model can be summed up by the following system of four equations:
In the first equation, the public deficit is financed by money; in the second equation, the demand for money is written in implicit form; in the third, the Fisher equation is stated; in the fourth, the public deficit financed by money changes through time according to the function f(t), which tries to capture the fiscal crisis. By combining equations (5), (6), (7) and (8) we get:
This differential equation can be written as, 
The first says that the inflation tax (mπ) goes to a positive value when the real quantity of money approaches zero. The second condition assumes that the cost of money services increases when the real quantity of money decreases. As a consequence, as the real balances goes to zero the inflation tax is bounded away from zero. In fact, equations (6) and (7) imply that
. In Appendix C we relax the hypothesis that the money demand is inelastic with respect to the nominal interest rate.
Before we provide a general solution to the model it will be interesting to analyse the particular case where the public deficit to be financed by money is constant, which has been the usual situation considered in the literature (see Bruno and Fischer (1990) In this diagram, we examine three hypotheses. The first (AA) supposes that the public deficit to be financed by money is less than the maximum value of the services provided by money. The model has a steady-state equilibrium where the inflation rate is constant.
The second hypothesis (OB) assumes that the public deficit to be financed by money is equal to the limit of the function s(m) when the real quantity of money approaches zero.
The model now has a hyperinflation steady-state equilibrium. The third hypothesis (CC) presupposes that the public deficit to be financed by money is greater than the maximum of the value of the services provided by money. The economic agents know this fact beforehand and they will try to get rid immediately of the stock of money they hold. Thus, the model yields hyperinflation, which is not a steady-state equilibrium.
We may conclude that a constant public deficit to be financed by money can yield hyperinflation. However, this condition cannot bring about a hyperinflation path, but only an instantaneous hyperinflation. This fact has not been observed in hyperinflation experiences that have occurred in the past century. Furthermore, there is no evidence that a constant public deficit to be financed by money should be a good working hypothesis (see Note 5).
The nonautonomous differential equation (9) However, the dynamics of hyperinflation will follow the path described above until the time of the currency reform.
CONCLUSION
No currently available model in the literature can provide an equilibrium hyperinflation without departing from rational expectations and/or fully informed agents.
We have shown in this paper that the hyperinflation phenomenon is consistent with a competitive equilibrium with rational expectations and complete information. The driving force behind that result is an increasing fiscal deficit to be financed by issuing money. The public knows beforehand that the economic policy regime will break down since the fiscal crisis is not tenable. Despite anticipating a possibly unbounded path for the inflaton rate, people optimally choose to carry a small, but positive, amount of money.
Some implications of our model are consistent with the facts observed in several hyperinflation experiences during the twentieth century. Among them are: a) hyperinflation duration depends upon the degree and velocity of the fiscal crisis, on the maximum amount the economy can collect from inflation tax and on the real rate of interest; b) inflation inertia is caused only by the inertia of the fiscal crisis; c) the end of the hyperinflation occurs before the deficit financed issuing money reaches the maximum value of the inflation tax; d) the hyperinflation path is such that at the moment that the real stock of money approaches zero (m → 0), its rate of change is negative ( )
The theory of hyperinflation presented in this paper can address the issue of defining hyperinflation, where there is no need for an arbitrary threshold inflation rate as in Cagan's classical definition. Hyperinflation will be defined as beginning in the month where the intertemporal budget constraint is not sustainable, conditional on no change in the economic policy regime and as ending in the month where this constraint is satisfied.
Recent research developed to test the sustainability of the public debt can be applied to examine the question that is at the core of hyperinflation: does the size of the government deficit to be financed by money imply that the intertemporal budget constraint is not sustainable if a policy regime switch does not occur? 7
Appendix A
We consider an economy in which a representative agent maximizes the discounted flow of utility (1), with respect to the variables c, z, M and ∆M(T), subject to the restrictions (2) and (3). The Lagragian form of this problem is: 
7 See, for example, Trehan and Walsh (1991) for applications of these tests to U.S. federal budget and current account deficits. The derivative of (A3) with respect to time, taking into account these two last expressions and the fact that marginal utility of consumption is constant, can be written as:
, we may conclude that the nominal rate of interest is equal to the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for money:
Appendix B
Consider the differential equation (10). Setting t = 0, T = t h and using the fact that m(t) → 0 as t → t h , t < t h , one obtains Since a can be any number on (0,1), there are uncountable solutions for (B4).
It should be emphasized that constraint (B5) was imposed to ensure existence of the solution, not to ensure multiplicity. In other words, given the existence, nonuniqueness naturally arises. When the model has multiple solutions several possibilities arise. For instance, one may assume that the initial real quantity of money is given by the
where M 0 is the exogenous initial nominal stock of money. That amounts to say that the initial price level is not allowed to jump at the moment people learn that the economy entered at a hyperinflationary path.
Appendix C
In this Appendix we discuss some technical issues we have not gone through so far. For a while, we will stick to the assumption that the money demand is inelastic with respect to the interest rate.
As previously mentioned, we want our model to yield a hyperinflation path without violating the government budget constraint. We implicitly assume that there exists a path for m that respects (B1), so that our exercise is not an empty one.
If no such path existed, we could still relax the hyphotesis that the initial price level p(0) is exogenous and let it increase (so that the initial value of the real balances would fall) up to the point that was possible to find a path for m to balance the government budget. In other words, we want f, v and u be such that the set of functions m(⋅) that
is not empty. Since s is positive, it is clear that for f sufficiently low there will be such an
m(⋅).
Constraint (C1) is required to ensure that the government can balance its budget.
However, to ensure that the model generates a hyperinflation path another condition is required. Namely, we need to ensure that terminal inflation tax can finance terminal fiscal deficit and a decrease in real balance.
As We now relax the hypothesis that money demand is inelastic with respect to the nominal interest rate. Condition (C1) is still needed to ensure that the government balances its budget.
An important difference that arises when we remove our hypothesis on the money demand elasticity is the shape of the curve m t in Figure 4 . It is not possible to ensure that this curve is decreasing with respect to time. However, it still is possible for the model to display an increasing inflation path. A necessary condition for this is Hence, the inflation does not diverge to infinite.
Assuming that the money demand is interest-rate inelastic indeed generates a more elegant solution, since that hypothesis allows inflation to explode in finite time. However, we would like to emphasize that all hyperinflation episodes in history ended while the inflation was still bounded. Hence, to account for the observed hyperinflation phenomena we do not need to make that assumption.
